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Abstract
We experimentally investigate simultaneous decision-making in two contrasting
environments: a competitive environment (a contest) and a cooperative environment (a voluntary
contribution mechanism). We find that the cooperative nature of the voluntary contribution
mechanism spills over to the contest, decreasing sub-optimal overbidding in the contest.
However, contributions to the public good are not affected by simultaneous participation in the
contest. There is a significant negative correlation between decisions made in competitive and
cooperative environments, i.e. more cooperative subjects tend to be less competitive and vice
versa. This correlation can be rationalized by heterogeneous social preferences towards
inequality but not by bounded rationality theory.
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1. Introduction
Individuals, firms, and policy makers simultaneously interact in many different
environments in practice. At the store checkout line an individual may choose how much to
spend on lottery tickets (thus participating in a contest) and how much to donate to a charity
(thus providing a public good). In the workplace, workers compete with each other for
promotions while simultaneously working together on various tasks that are assigned to them.
Farm owners may compete daily with each other in the market for their products and at the same
time they may cooperate to build facilities that would be mutually beneficial to reduce waste
management costs.
The novel contribution of the current study is that we experimentally investigate
individual behavior when competitive and cooperative environments are present simultaneously.
To induce two contrasting environments, we employ a voluntary contribution mechanism
(cooperative environment) and a lottery contest (competitive environment). In the voluntary
contribution mechanism (VCM), individuals make contributions in order to provide a public
good. In the contest, individuals make bids in order to win a prize. The fundamental difference
between these two games is that bids in the contest exert a negative externality on others, while
contributions in the VCM exert a positive externality. The findings from the literature when
these games are played in isolation are clear and robust. In contests, individuals over-bid relative
to socially optimal levels (Davis and Reilly, 1998; Potters et al., 1998; Sheremeta, 2010a,c).1 In
VCMs, individuals contribute half-way between the equilibrium free riding and the Pareto
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It is also documented that over-bidding decreases with experience (Davis and Reilly, 1998), groups make lower
bids than individuals (Sheremeta and Zhang, 2010), and constraining individual endowments reduces over-bidding
(Sheremeta, 2010a).
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optimal level, with contributions declining over time (Ledyard, 1995; Fischbacher et al., 2001).2
The contest is similar in practice to a wide variety of situations such as patent races, political
contests, competitions for promotions in the workplace, or advertising campaigns. The VCM is
similar to another broad class of situations, including the decision to volunteer for various groups
or associations and voluntary monetary contributions to public goods or charities. The design of
the experiment also permits us to analyze the correlation between each individual’s bid in the
contest and his or her contribution in the VCM.
The standard assumption in game theory is game independence, suggesting that the
institutional context in which a decision is made does not matter. This assumption is questioned
by recent experiments, which find that context matters greatly in some environments. Behavioral
spillovers occur when games are played simultaneously, causing behaviors exhibited in one
game to be carried over to the other game in a predictable way (Huck et al., 2007; Bednar et al.,
2009; Falk et al., 2009; Cason et al., 2009). Bednar et al. (2009) report a laboratory experiment
with different two-player games and find that simultaneous game-play differs from isolated
controls. Cason et al. (2009) report a laboratory experiment where the same group of five players
participate in two different coordination games and find that cooperative behavior spills over
from one game to the other.3 Huck et al. (2007) study two dissimilar two-player games played
simultaneously and find that learning spillovers occur when feedback is not readily available for
each game. On the contrary, Falk et al. (2009) investigate groups of different individuals playing
two identical coordination games or two identical public goods games, and find that behavior

2

Contributions increase when subjects are allowed to punish, assign disapproval points, send signals, or
communicate with other subjects prior to contributions in the VCM (Ledyard, 1995; Fehr and Gachter, 2000).
3
Cherry et al. (2003) and Cherry and Shogren (2007) also find that rationality exhibited in one setting affects
behavior in a disparate setting introduced sequentially. Dickinson and Oxoby (2009) find that optimistic or
pessimistic expectations developed in one setting can carry over to acceptance rates in an ultimatum game.
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does not differ from the baseline where only one game at a time is played.4 The main difference
of our study is that we investigate behavior in both competitive and cooperative environments,
while previous studies consider coordination and public good games (Falk et al., 2009; Cason et
al., 2009) or bi-matrix games such as the prisoner’s dilemma (Bednar et al., 2009).
We find that overbidding in the contest is significantly reduced when individuals
simultaneously participate in the VCM. This is a favorable outcome because overbidding in
contests leads to sub-optimal results. However, we do not find significant differences in VCM
contributions between the simultaneous-play and baseline treatments. We also find that there is a
negative correlation between decisions made in the lottery contest and in the VCM, suggesting
that individuals who are more competitive tend to be less cooperative and vice versa. As
discussed in the conclusion, this research has broad implications for political and management
institutional design, and for related research that attempts to solve problems of overbidding in
contests and under-contribution in public goods.

2. Experimental Design
2.1. Theoretical Predictions
The experimental design employs two games, a lottery contest and a VCM. The lottery
contest is based on the theoretical model of Tullock (1980). In this contest,
neutral players with initial endowment levels

compete for a prize

probability that a player wins the prize is equal to player ’s own bid

identical risk-

by submitting bids. The
divided by the sum of

all players’ bids. Given this, the expected payoff from the contest for player can be written as:
4

Other existing studies consider simultaneous interaction in several public goods environments, either breaking a
single public good into multiple parts or presenting multiple public goods (Bernasconi et al., 2009; Biele et al.,
2008; Fellner and Lunser, 2008).
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Differentiating (1) with respect to

(1)
and accounting for the symmetric Nash equilibrium leads to
1 /

the classic solution of

The VCM is based on a linear public goods game where
choose a portion of their endowments
1977). Player ’s contribution
of

0.

, while the socially optimal level of bids is

identical risk-neutral players

to contribute to a public good (Groves and Ledyard,

to the public good is multiplied by

0,1 and given to each

1. Thus, the payoff from the VCM for player can be

players in the group, where

written as:
∑

.

(2)

The Nash equilibrium in the VCM is to free ride by contributing nothing,
socially optimal solution is to contribute one’s full endowment to the public good,

0, while the
.

In the VCM (2), over-contribution relative to the Nash equilibrium leads to outcomes that
are closer to the socially optimal result. On the other hand, in the contest (1), overbidding is
socially wasteful and the most socially desirable outcome is for everybody to bid nothing. Note
that playing the games in ensemble does not change the standard Nash equilibrium prediction in
either game.

2.2. Experimental Procedures
The experiment was conducted at the Vernon Smith Experimental Economics
Laboratory. Volunteers were recruited from a pool of undergraduate students from Purdue
University. A total of 120 subjects participated in 6 sessions, with 20 subjects participating in
each session. All subjects participated in only one session of this study. Some students had
participated in other economics experiments that were unrelated to this research.
5

The computerized experimental sessions used z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) to record
subject decisions and also (in the Contest-VCM treatment) to record the order of decisions. We
conducted three treatments as summarized in Table 1: a baseline Contest treatment, a baseline
VCM treatment, and a treatment in which these two games were played simultaneously.5
Subjects were given the instructions, shown in the appendix, at the beginning of the session and
the experimenter read the instructions aloud. In each session, 20 subjects were randomly
assigned to groups of

= 4 players and stayed in the same group throughout the entire

experiment, playing each game for a total of 20 periods.
Table 1: Summary of Treatments
Treatment
Baseline Contest
Baseline VCM
Contest-VCM

Game Played
Contest
VCM
Contest & VCM

Number of
Sessions
2
2
2

Number of
Subjects
40
40
40

Number of Independent
Observations
10
10
10

At the beginning of each period, subjects received endowments of 80 francs in the contest
(or VCM) and were asked to enter their bids (or contributions in the VCM). In the lottery
contest, subjects competed with each other for the prize value of

= 80 francs. In the VCM,

each subject chose a portion of the 80 franc endowment to contribute to the public good, and
kept the other portion for himself. Each player’s contribution to the public good was multiplied
by

= 0.4 and the total of all contributions given to each of the 4 players in the group. Subjects

did not know others’ decisions before making their own decisions. After all subjects made their
decisions, the sum of all bids (or contributions in the VCM) in each group was displayed on the

5

Note that treatments with two simultaneous contests or two simultaneous public goods are also possible as
baselines. We believe that our Baseline Contest and Baseline VCM treatments are more appropriate for several
reasons. First, this design allows us to see if behavior in ensemble games is different from behavior in isolated
games. Second, there is no reason to believe that behavior in either the contest or the VCM would change if two of
the same games were played in ensemble, as documented by Falk et al.’s (2009) for the case of two VCMs.
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output screen together with the outcome, and earnings were determined. Subjects recorded their
results in a record sheet, and then moved on to the next period.
During the Contest-VCM treatment, the contest and VCM games were displayed side by
side on the same screen.6 Subjects received a separate endowment in the contest and a separate
endowment in the VCM at the beginning of each period. These endowments could not be
transferred between games. Subjects typed their choices into each input box, and clicked
“submit” at the bottom of the screen before moving on to the next period. To account for any
order effect within each period, in one of the two Contest-VCM sessions, the contest game was
displayed on the left (the VCM game was on the right), and in the other Contest-VCM session,
the contest game was displayed on the right (the VCM game was on the left). During the
decision-making stage in the Contest-VCM sessions, subjects were instructed to click on the
input box for that game, and then enter their decision. A function was executed in z-Tree that
kept track of which input box the subject clicked on first.7
At the end of the experiment, two periods from the game were selected for payment using
a random draw from a bingo cage. In the Contest-VCM treatment, two periods from each game
(contest and VCM) were selected using the same method. Experimental francs were used
throughout the experiment, with a conversion rate of 25 francs = $1. Subjects earned $18 on
average, and sessions (including instruction time) lasted approximately 75 minutes. Subjects also
completed a demographic questionnaire at the end of each session.

6

We used categorical (and not ordinal) nomenclature to label each game, the colors blue and green (instead of, for
example, 1 and 2 or A and B).
7
When the contest game was displayed on the left, subjects made a decision in the contest game first 92% of the
time. When the VCM was displayed on the left, subjects made a decision in the VCM game first 93% of the time.
This is unsurprising, given that over 95% of subjects in the experiment self-reported that they read and write from
left to right horizontally in their native language, and that all instructions were in English, which reads from left to
right. We do not find any difference between individual behavior in the two Contest-VCM sessions; therefore, we
pool the sessions.
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3. Results & Discussion
3.1 Overview
Table 2 reports the average contribution in the VCM and the average bid in the contest
across all treatments. According to the theory, the unique equilibrium bid in the contest is

=

15. In contrast to the theoretical prediction, we find significant over-bidding of about 120% in
the baseline contest treatment. This finding is consistent with previous experimental findings,
which document that subjects overbid by up to 200% relative to the theoretical predictions
(Davis and Reilly, 1998; Potters et al., 1998; Sheremeta, 2010b,c). As the result of over-bidding,
subjects earn significantly lower payoffs than is predicted by the theory.8
Table 2: Average Statistics
Treatment

Equilibrium

Value of the Prize in Contest, V
80
MPCR in VCM, a
0.4
Number of Players, N
4
Bid in Contest
15
Payoff in Contest
105
Contribution in VCM
0
Payoff in VCM
80
Standard error of the mean in parentheses.

ContestVCM
80
0.4
4
26.8 (0.8)
73.2 (1.2)
22.4 (0.9)
93.4 (0.7)

Baseline
VCM
0.4
4

Baseline
Contest
80
4
33.5 (0.8)
66.5 (1.2)

23.9 (1.0)
94.3 (0.8)

The unique equilibrium prediction for contributions in the VCM is

= 0. However, any

over-contribution relative to the equilibrium leads to more desirable outcomes; specifically,
contribution of the full endowment results in the most socially optimal outcome. Relative to
theoretical predictions, we find significant over-contribution in the VCM in all treatments. This
finding is consistent with previous experimental studies, which report that over-contribution is
common in public goods environments due to altruism or social norms (Ledyard, 1995). Fehr
8

To determine the net payoff from the contest, subtract the endowment of 80 from payoffs in Table 3.1.
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and Gachter (2000) report contribution levels at 40-60% of the endowment during the
experiment, with contributions falling to 27% in the final period. Note that as the result of overcontribution, subjects’ payoffs in the VCM are significantly higher than the equilibrium
prediction.
Result 1. Relative to theoretical predictions, there is significant over-bidding in the
contest and significant over-contribution in the VCM in all treatments.
Figure 1: Distribution of Bid/Contribution
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Figure 1 displays the distribution of contributions in the VCM and bids in the contest
over all periods by treatment. Individual bids in the contest are distributed on the entire strategy
space, contrary to the unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium of 15. Individual contributions in
the VCM are also distributed on the entire strategy space, contrary to the unique pure strategy
Nash equilibrium of 0. A high variance in individual bids is consistent with previous
experimental findings in the contest (Davis and Reilly, 1998; Potters et al., 1998; Sheremeta,
2010a,b). The distribution of contributions in the VCM is also consistent with previous
experimental findings (Ledyard, 1995; Fehr and Gachter, 2000; Fischbacher et al., 2001).
9

3.2 Comparison of Simultaneous with Baselines
Figure 2 displays the average contribution and the average bid over all 20 periods of the
experiment for the baseline and Contest-VCM treatments. In order to study the effect of
displaying two games simultaneously, we examine decisions in the first five periods and
decisions in the last five periods.9 In the baseline VCM treatment, the average contribution in the
VCM starts at 36.7 in the first five periods and decreases to 12.6 in the last five periods.
Similarly, in the Contest-VCM treatment, the average contribution starts at 35.6 in the first five
periods and decreases to 11.5 in the last five periods. A regression of the contribution on a period
trend shows a significant and negative relationship for both treatments (p-value < 0.01). The
difference between contributions in the baseline VCM and Contest-VCM treatments is not
statistically significant based on a Wilcoxon rank-sum test (p-value = 0.54).10
Result 2: Simultaneously participating in the contest does not have a significant effect on
contributions in the VCM.
Related literature reports that when playing two simultaneous public goods games with
different groups, individuals are influenced in each game by the contributions of their own group
members, and not by the contributions of the other group members (Falk et al., 2009). We find
that even when playing with the same subjects, bids in the contest do not influence contributions
to the public good. This is consistent with Falk et al.’s (2009) observation that the abstraction to

9

Note that while comparison of decisions made in period 1 may be more appropriate for understanding decision
making without the influence of the concurrently displayed game, we average decisions across the first five periods
because subjects are still learning in the first few periods. We compare decision-making at the beginning of the
session (first five periods) to decision-making at the end of the session (last five periods).
10
The non-parametric tests use the average contribution (bid) in each group across all the periods for each
observation, and groups in this fixed matching design are statistically independent.
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study public goods behavior in laboratory games, where individuals are only participating in one
game, may be a good approximation for behavior in practice.11
Figure 2: Average Bid/Contribution by Treatments
Bid
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In the baseline Contest treatment, the average bid starts at 36.5 in the first five periods
and decreases to 33.7 in the last five periods. In the Contest-VCM treatment, the average bid in
the contest starts at 31.5 in the first five periods and decreases to 24.4 in the last five periods. A
regression of the bid on a period trend shows a significant and negative relationship for the
Contest-VCM treatment (p-value < 0.01) but not for the baseline Contest treatment (p-value =
0.21).12 Overall, the declining bid trend is consistent with previous research, documenting that
over-bidding decreases over time (Davis and Reilly, 1998; Sheremeta, 2010a,c).

11

Note that in the Falk et al. (2009) and in our study, endowments are not shared between the two games; rather,
subjects receive a set endowment for each game. This result may be most applicable in this setting, but whether this
result holds when endowments are shared across simultaneous games could be considered in future work.
12
However, when controlling for the lagged bids, we find a significant period trend in both treatments (see Table
3.2).
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The difference between bids in the baseline Contest and Contest-VCM treatments is
statistically significant based on a Wilcoxon rank-sum test (p-value = 0.06, 2-tailed test).13
Figure 3 displays, by group, the average over-dissipation rates, defined as the ratio of the total
sum of bids to the value of the prize. On average, groups in the baseline Contest treatment have
greater over-dissipation rates than groups in the Contest-VCM treatment. This difference in
behavior can be explained by the developing literature on simultaneous decision-making, which
suggests that behavior spills over from one game to another in predictable ways (Cason et al.,
2009; Bednar et al., 2009).14 We provide a more detailed discussion in Section 4.3.
Result 4: Simultaneously participating in the VCM significantly reduces overbidding in
the contest.
Figure 3: Over-dissipation Rates by Groups
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This difference is especially significant when looking at the last 10 periods of the experiment (p-value < 0.01).
Cason et al. (2009), for example, find that participating in a more cooperative environment can work to increase
cooperation in a less cooperative environment. Likewise, we find that participating in the cooperative VCM
environment helps to reduce competitive over-bidding in the contest.

14
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Table 3: Regression Models of Individual Subject Choices
Dependent Variable:
Individual Subject Choices in

Contest Bid
(1)
(2)
Baseline
ContestContest
VCM

Contest Bid
VCM Contribution
Lag of Group Contest Bid

0.02
(0.02)

Lag of Group VCM Contribution

VCM Contribution
(3)
(4)
ContestBaseline
VCM
VCM
-0.31
(0.19)

-0.13*
(0.06)
0.08**
(0.02)
0.14**
(0.01)
39.52**
(7.12)
760
40

Inverse of Period

17.35**
29.8**
(5.87)
(2.5)
Observations
760
760
Number of subjects
40
40
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Standard errors in parentheses.
Columns (2) and (4) are estimated using a simultaneous system of equations

0.19**
(0.01)
30.8**
(10.00)
760
40

We find that bid choices in the contest are influenced by contribution choices in the
VCM, but that contribution choices in the VCM are not affected by bid choices in the contest.
Table 3 reports regression results that also support these findings. We estimate regressions
separately for the contest and the VCM, using the subjects’ choices as the dependent variable. A
period trend, the bid (contribution), and lagged total group bid (contribution) are the independent
variables. The previous period group choices in each game positively influence the current
choice in all treatments (however, this effect is not significant in specification 1). This suggests
that, in line with previous VCM and contest studies, subjects’ decisions in the current period are
influenced by their group members’ decisions in the previous period (Croson et al., 2005;
Sheremeta, 2010a). In the Contest-VCM treatment, we also find that the individual’s
contribution in the current period negatively affects the individual bid in the current period
(column 2), while the individual’s bid in the current period does not affect the individual’s

13

contribution in the current period (column 4). The estimation of equations in columns (2) and (4)
used a simultaneous equation system since subjects made both game decisions at the same
time.15 These findings support Results 3 and 4 - that simultaneous participation in the contest
does not have a significant effect on VCM contributions, but that simultaneous participation in
the VCM has a significant effect on contest bids.

3.3 Behavioral Effects
As in previous work (Bednar et al., 2009; Cason et al., 2009), we use the concepts of
cognitive load and behavioral spillover to explain the change in behavior when games are played
simultaneously. Both effects can be applied as possible explanations for Results 3 and 4. The
cognitive load effect suggests that due to limited cognitive abilities, the subject’s behavior in a
more complex game may be affected by decision-making strategies from the easier game. The
behavioral spillover effect suggests that behavior can “spill over” from one game to another
when the two games are played simultaneously.
Cognitive load is a construct in psychology representing the burden that performing a
task imposes on the learner’s cognitive system (Simon, 1982; Paas and van Merrienboer, 1994).
Playing ensembles of games increases cognitive load, which causes subjects to apply common
analogies to disparate bargaining situations, and this has been modeled formally by Samuelson
(2001). When a problem is complex and requires high cognitive load, individuals may use
heuristics or “rules of thumb” to make decisions (Wright, 1980; Gigerenzer et al., 1996). In the
present context, cognitive limitations may cause subjects to apply similar strategies to the contest

15

We used session dummy-variables to control for session effects. The estimation results are very similar when
using individual subject dummy-variables to control for individual subject effects. The only exception is that in
specification (2) the VCM Contribution variable is no longer significant. The main reason is that in the estimation of
simultaneous equation system with subject dummy-variables we need to use too many degrees of freedom.
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and VCM in order to reduce cognitive burdens. Specifically, strategies from lower cognitive load
games could be applied to games with higher cognitive load. Psychologists propose various
methods for measuring cognitive load; for an overview, see Paas et al. (2003). A relevant
measure for assessment of cognitive load is the complexity of the game. We posit that cognitive
load is greater in the contest than in the VCM. First, the contest involves greater uncertainty than
the VCM. In the VCM, each subject forms beliefs about other’s contributions and determines her
probable outcome. In the contest, on the other hand, each subject must first form beliefs about
other’s bids and then form a belief about the probability that her bid will win, where this
probability also depends on other group members’ bids.16 Second, the decision-making process
in the contest is much more involved than in the VCM, and while the equilibrium of the VCM is
in dominant strategies, the equilibrium for the contest is not. Moreover, the payoff function is
flatter (and concave) in the contest than in the VCM. For the above reasons, the cognitive load
effect should cause the subject to use strategies from the VCM to motivate her behavior in the
contest, thus lowering contest bids.
The direction of behavioral spillover can be predicted by the level of strategic
uncertainty and social interaction effects in the two games. Cason et al. (2009) posit that games
with lower strategic uncertainty have a stronger behavioral spillover effect onto other games,
and use a measurement of volatility to describe the degree of strategic uncertainty. Similarly, we
propose that the behavioral spillover effect causes behavior in games with a lower volatility of
individual decisions across different periods to “spill over” onto games with a higher volatility of
decisions. We measure the degree of volatility in individual decision-making by computing the
absolute difference between the decisions made in period t and period t-1. We find that in the
Contest-VCM treatment, the average volatility of bids in the contest is higher than the average
16

Understanding probability can be difficult for subjects due to bounded rationality (Camerer, 2003).
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volatility of contributions in the VCM (14.8 versus 12.2).17 This result suggests that the VCM
game should have a stronger behavioral spillover effect onto the contest.
Falk et al. (2009) find that behavior in public goods games is in large part influenced by
the social interaction effect, which suggests that individuals change their behavior in response to
changes in their respective group members’ behavior. Another possible explanation for the
direction of the behavioral spillover is that there is a greater social interaction effect in the VCM
as compared to the contest, which implies that behavior in the contest should not influence
behavior in the VCM, while behavior in the VCM should influence behavior in the contest. To
measure the social interaction effect, we separately estimated regressions for each individual in
the baseline treatments. The dependent variable is the total of other group’s contributions (bids)
in the previous period and the independent variable is the subject’s contribution (bid) in the
current period. The coefficient on lagged group choices is statistically significant for 4 out of 40
subjects in the contest and 10 out of 40 subjects in the public good. Moreover, in all of the
regressions which were statistically significant in the VCM, the effect moves in a predictable
direction – all coefficients on previous group choices are negative, even after accounting for the
linear period trend. On the other hand, there is no such pattern in the contest. Another way to
measure the social interaction effect is to compare the volatility of choices across individuals
within each group over time. In the contest, the average standard deviation of bids across all
groups is 15.1 in periods 1-5 and 14.3 in periods 15-20. In the VCM, the average standard
deviation of contributions is 14.5 in periods 1-5 and it falls to 8.1 in periods 15-20. The
substantial decrease in volatility of individual contributions in the VCM implies that the VCM

17

When using the data from the baseline treatments, the average volatility in contests is 14.8 and in VCMs it is 13.4.
Using the average volatility in bids and contributions within each group across all the periods as one independent
observation, the sign test of matched pairs can reject the equality of volatilities at 0.1 significance level.
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has a stronger social interaction effect.18 The stronger social interaction effect in the VCM
suggests that behavior in the VCM is less likely to have a significant spillover effect onto
behavior in the contest.19
Finally, behavioral spillover can occur due to the presence of ‘conditional cooperators’ in
the VCM game, i.e. subjects who contribute more to a public good the more others contribute
(Fischbacher et al., 2001). The presence of conditional cooperators has been documented in the
lab and in the field (Fischbacher et al., 2001; Keser and Winden, 2002; Harrison and List, 2004;
Fischbacher and Gächter, 2006; Kocher et al., 2007; Herrmann and Thoni, 2009). The behavior
of conditional cooperators is based on their perception of the “type” of individuals with whom
they are interacting: for example, knowing that others are the “free-rider” type, conditional
cooperators also free ride. In fact, any factor that influences beliefs about the nature of others’
cooperation may influence the behavior of conditional cooperators (Gächter, 2006). If several
games are present concurrently, the “type” of individual one is grouped with may be inferred
from group members’ behavior in any of the games present. In our experiment, conditional
cooperators can form beliefs about types in their group in one game (contest or VCM), and apply
these beliefs to a disparate game (VCM or contest). By reducing contest bids, subjects may
signal their cooperative type to conditional cooperators in order to induce higher contribution to
the VCM.
To summarize, we find that participation in the public goods environment influences
individuals to bid less in the contest, which may occur due to several possible effects. Cognitive
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Note that the biggest difference between bids in the baseline Contest and Contest-VCM treatment is in the last
five periods of the experiment (Figure 3.2). Volatility in VCM is the lowest in the last five periods as well.
19
One could also argue that the VCM evokes a social norm of cooperation that reduces competitiveness in the
contest (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1996). However, such argument would imply that, as contributions to the
VCM decline (thus reducing social norms), bids in contests should increase. Figure 3.2 shows that this is clearly not
the case, since both the contributions and bids decline over time in the Contest-VCM treatment.
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load may cause subjects to apply the strategy from the public goods game to the contest,
decreasing bids. Discovering the direction of behavioral spillover is more complex. The strategic
uncertainty effect may act to cause behavior in the VCM to spill over onto behavior in the
contest. In addition, the presence of conditional cooperators may act to cause behavior in the
VCM to spill over onto behavior in the contest.

3.4 Correlation of Bids and Contributions
Another contribution of our study is that we can directly compare bids in the contest with
contributions in the VCM. This is possible because of the within-subjects design of the ContestVCM treatment. Figure 4 displays individual contributions and bids for the Contest-VCM
treatment, averaged over periods 1-5 and periods 16-20. A Spearman’s rank correlation test
shows that individuals who contribute more to the VCM also bid less in contests in the first five
periods of the game (correlation -0.27, p-value < 0.10).20
Result 5. Subjects who bid more in the contest also tend to contribute less in the VCM.
To explain the negative correlation between bids and contributions, we consider two
competing theories that are often employed to explain individual behavior in the public goods
and contest experiments. The two common explanations for non-zero contributions to public
goods are based on social preferences (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Sobel, 2005) and bounded
rationality or mistakes (Andreoni, 1995; Anderson et al., 1998; Houser and Kurzban, 2002). The
same arguments are also applied to explain over-bidding in contests (Herrmann and Orzen, 2008;
Sheremeta, 2010a). The design of our novel Contest-VCM treatment enables us to distinguish

20

We also used only the period 1 contributions and bids to look at correlation and found only slight insignificant
correlation. It is likely that subjects are still learning in the first period and thus their decisions are noisy.
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between these two competing theories, as they generate opposing predictions for the correlation
of bids and contributions.
Figure 4: Correlation of Bids and Contributions (Periods 1-5 and 16-20 averaged)
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Social preferences are often cited as the reason why behavior is not in line with theory in
many settings. A variety of social preference models may account for the negative correlation of
bids and contributions, and our goal is not to distinguish among them. Rather, our objective is to
present a simple model that can inform our findings, and we use the inequality aversion model
because it is one which has been formally presented in both the VCM and contest literature as a
possible justification for observed behavior (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Hermann and Orzen,
2008). In the public goods literature, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) show how inequality aversion
may explain individual behavior in the VCM. In the contest literature, Grund and Sliwka (2005)
and Herrmann and Orzen (2008) demonstrate that inequality aversion may account for overbidding. It is straightforward to show that inequality aversion can explain the negative
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correlation between bids and contributions.21 As in Fehr and Schmidt (1999), assume that
subject suffers from inequality and his utility is given by:
,

max

,0

This utility function assumes that subject

max

earns one less franc than subject , his utility is reduced by

subject

also dislikes advantageous inequality to some extent,

higher disadvantageous inequality

(3)

dislikes disadvantageous inequality, i.e. if

subject

disadvantageous inequality, i.e.

,0 .

0 francs. Further,
0, but not as much as

. The utility function (3) implies that subjects who have
should make lower contributions in the VCM in order to

avoid the circumstance where they are the highest contributors with the lowest payoffs. The
same subjects should bid more in the lottery contest in order to avoid a circumstance where they
do not win a prize and thus receive the lowest payoff (Herrmann and Orzen, 2008). The key
reason why social preferences work in the opposite direction in the VCM and the contest is that
in the VCM, individual contributions exert a positive externality on others, while in the contest
individual bids exert a negative externality on others.
Another common argument for over-contribution in the VCM and over-bidding in
contests is bounded rationality. Individuals often make mistakes when contributing to public
goods or bidding in contests. Anderson et al. (1998) directly test this hypothesis by applying a
quantal response equilibrium (QRE) model, which accounts for errors made by individual
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Several other social preference models exist which can, individually or in ensemble, explain our findings. Similar
to the inequality aversion model, one can make an argument that kindness or “warm glow” can explain the negative
correlation between contributions in the VCM and bids in contests. Andreoni (1995) hypothesized that one of the
reasons why people contribute to public goods is kindness. Although no formal arguments have been made of what
is the effect of kindness on individual behavior in contests, it is intuitive that more kind individuals should bid less
in order to allow others to win the contest. Therefore, the presence of kindness would imply negative correlation
between bids and contributions. Spiteful preferences are also a possible explanation for the correlation, and several
studies have noted that spite plays a major role in sanctioning in public goods experiments (Falk et al., 2005). Under
this model, subjects prefer to earn more than others, and therefore may over-bid in the contest but contribute less in
the VCM.
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subjects, to the VCM. They find that depending on the magnitude of the decision error, mean
contributions to the public good lie between the Nash prediction and half the endowment, and
higher decision errors correspond to higher contributions. In our experiment, this implies that
0 and

contributions in the VCM should be between

40. Sheremeta (2010a) shows how

the QRE can explain some over-dissipation in lottery contests. The prediction of the QRE is that
when the endowment is equal to the prize value (as it is in our experiment) then mean bids in the
contest lie between the Nash prediction and half the endowment, and higher decision errors
correspond to higher bids. In our experiment, this implies that bids in the contest should be
between

15 and

40. Moreover, bounded rationality implies that subjects who make

more mistakes both contribute and bid more, which should result in a positive, rather than
negative, correlation between bids and contributions.
Note that the negative correlation between individual contributions and bids disappears
over time. When analyzing the last five periods of the experiment, we do not find a significant
correlation (correlation 0.13, p-value = 0.43). This result is not surprising, given the fact that by
the end of the experiment, subjects’ decisions have already been heavily influenced by the
decisions of others and therefore social preferences play a less significant role in the later
periods.22

4. Conclusion
We investigated simultaneous decision-making in two contrasting environments: a
competitive environment (lottery contest) and a cooperative environment (voluntary contribution
22

We have re-estimated Table 3.2 separately for periods 1-5 and 16-20. The estimation results confirm that
individual choices are significantly influenced by group choices in first five periods (p-values are less than 0.01 for
the contest and VCM). On the other hand, group choices do not affect significantly individual choices in the last
period (p-values are 0.71 and 0.23 for the contest and VCM).
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mechanism). We found that the cooperative nature of the voluntary contribution mechanism
favorably influenced the contest in the simultaneous decision-making treatment by decreasing
over-dissipation in the contest. This result can be explained by behavioral spillover and social
interaction effects. We also found that there is a significant negative correlation between
decisions made in the lottery contest and in the VCM, which can be justified by heterogeneous
social preferences towards inequality but not by bounded rationality theory.
Our findings have several practical implications. It is well documented that overdissipation in contests occurs in the advertising industry as firms compete with each other in ad
campaigns (Cason and Datta, 2006) and in political contests, where candidates spend more than
the efficient amount on campaigning (Sheremeta, 2010b). A number of studies have tried to find
ways to reduce over-dissipation, such as repetition (Davis and Reilly, 1998), constraining
endowments (Parco et al., 2005; Sheremeta, 2010a), and group decision-making (Sheremeta and
Zhang, 2010). Our study points out that another way to reduce over-dissipation in a contest is to
allow subjects to participate simultaneously in a public goods game. In practice, this suggests
that individuals participating in giving to charities or volunteering at community organizations
should over-dissipate less in contests. Therefore, this may explain why the observed levels of
over-dissipation in the lab are higher than in the field (Hazlett and Michaels, 1993; Sheremeta
and Zhang, 2010).
Another implication of our findings is for designing optimal organizational structure of
firms. It is well known that rent-seeking occurs in firms because workers, management and
owners have incentives to invest resources in disputes over the firm’s profits, which reduces firm
efficiency (Congleton, 2008). Firms with an organizational structure that reduces these socially
wasteful activities will be relatively more efficient. For example, related work has suggested that
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certain changes to ownership structure (Muller and Warneryd, 2001; Congleton, 1989) will
reduce rent-seeking. Our findings provide guidance for reducing inefficient rent-seeking
activities within firms through the incorporation of more cooperative activities among workers.
In particular, an organization that encourages cooperative activities within groups or promotions
based on group effort may see a reduction in rent-seeking. This partly explains why greater
emphasis has been placed on team work in organizations in past years, and why team work can
lead to greater organizational success (Cohen, 1997).
Although game independence is a standard assumption in game theory, our findings
provide clear evidence that the institutional context in which a decision is made matters for the
games under study. Given that many activities in practice involve simultaneous decision-making
in environments similar to contests and public goods, it is important to study these competitive
and cooperative environments in ensemble. Future research should study behavioral spillovers
when the contest and public goods game are played sequentially, and compare this to
simultaneous behavioral spillovers. Considering other alternative environments for competition
(such as first and second price auctions, oligopolistic competition, and rank-order tournaments)
and cooperation (such as trust games, weakest-link public goods, and common pool resources) is
also of great interest. Finally, it is important to investigate how behavioral spillovers can be used
to design more efficient economic systems. We leave these extensions for future research.
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Appendix – Instructions (Contest-VCM Treatment)
INSTRUCTIONS: In this experiment you will participate in a game with three other participants. You will not
know the identity of the participants you are grouped with. The experiment will consist of 20 periods. You will
participate in both a BLUE GAME and a GREEN GAME at the same time and with the same participants. The
BLUE GAME will appear on the left side of the screen and the GREEN GAME will appear on the right side of the
screen at the same time in all 20 periods.
At the end of the experiment 2 out of 20 periods will be randomly selected for payment for the BLUE
GAME and 2 out of 20 periods will be randomly selected for payment for the GREEN GAME. After you have
completed all periods two tokens will be randomly drawn out of a bingo cage containing tokens numbered from 1 to
20. The token numbers determine which two periods are going to be paid in the BLUE GAME. These tokens will be
returned to the bingo cage, and two tokens will be randomly drawn again out of a bingo cage containing tokens
numbered from 1 to 20. The token numbers determine which two periods are going to be paid in the GREEN
GAME.
Each period you will be given 80 francs for the BLUE GAME and 80 francs for the GREEN GAME.
Francs will be converted to U.S. dollars at the end of the experiment at the rate of 25 francs = $1. Each period, you
will select a bid for the BLUE GAME and an allocation for the GREEN GAME. When you are ready to make your
decision, click on the “input boxes” below “How much would you like to bid?” and “How much would you like to
allocate to the Group Account?” and the program will allow you to enter in your number choices. When you are
finished making your choices, click “Submit”.

BLUE GAME: Each period, you and all other participants will be given an initial endowment of 80 francs and you
will be asked to decide how much you want to bid for a reward. The reward is worth 80 francs to you and the other
three participants in your group. You may bid any integer number of francs between 0 and 80. After all participants
have made their decisions, your earnings for the period are calculated. These earnings will be converted to cash and
paid at the end of the experiment if the current period is the period that is randomly chosen for payment. If you
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receive the reward your period earnings are equal to your endowment plus the reward minus your bid. If you do not
receive the reward your period earnings are equal to your endowment minus your bid.
If you receive the reward: Earnings = Endowment + Reward – Your Bid = 80 + 80 – Your Bid
If you do not receive the reward: Earnings = Endowment – Your Bid = 80 – Your Bid
The more you bid, the more likely you are to receive the reward. The more the other participants in your group bid,
the less likely you are to receive the reward. Specifically, for each franc you bid you will receive one lottery ticket.
At the end of each period the computer draws randomly one ticket among all the tickets purchased by 4
participants in the group, including you. The owner of the drawn ticket receives the reward of 80 francs. Thus, your
chance of receiving the reward is given by the number of francs you bid divided by the total number of francs all 4
participants in your group bid. You can never guarantee yourself the reward. However, by increasing your bid, you
can increase your chance of receiving the reward. Regardless of who receives the reward, all participants will have
to pay their bids.
Chance of receiving the
reward

=

Your Bid
Sum of all 4 Bids in your group

In case all participants bid zero, the reward is randomly assigned to one of the four participants in the group.
Example: This is a hypothetical example used to illustrate how the computer is making a random draw. Let’s say
participant 1 bids 10 francs, participant 2 bids 15 francs, participant 3 bids 0 francs, and participant 4 bids 40 francs.
Therefore, the computer assigns 10 lottery tickets to participant 1, 15 lottery tickets to participant 2, 0 lottery tickets
to participant 3, and 40 lottery tickets for participant 4. Then the computer randomly draws one lottery ticket out of
65 (10 + 15 + 0 + 40). As you can see, participant 4 has the highest chance of receiving the reward: 0.62 = 40/65.
Participant 2 has 0.23 = 15/65 chance, participant 1 has 0.15 = 10/65 chance, and participant 3 has 0 = 0/65 chance
of receiving the reward.
After all participants make their bids, the computer will make a random draw which will decide who
receives the reward. Then the computer will calculate your period earnings based on your bid and whether you
received the reward or not.
GREEN GAME: Each period you will be given 80 francs and you will be asked to decide how much of this
amount you want to allocate to a Group Account. The remainder will be automatically allocated to your Individual
Account. You may allocate any integer number of francs between 0 and 80. After all participants have made their
decisions, your earnings for the period are calculated. These earnings will be converted to cash and paid at the end
of the experiment if the current period is the period that is randomly chosen for payment. Your earnings consist of
two parts
1) Your earnings from the Individual Account
2) Your earnings from the Group Account
Your earnings from the Individual Account equal to the francs that you keep for yourself and do not depend on the
decisions of others. Therefore, for every franc you keep for yourself in your Individual Account, you earn 1 franc.
Your earnings from the Group Account depend on the total number of francs allocated to the Group Account by all
4 group members (including you). In particular, your earnings from the Group Account are 40 percent of the total
allocation of all 4 group members (including you) to the Group Account. Therefore, for every franc you allocate to
the Group Account, you increase the total allocation to the Group Account by 1 franc. Therefore, your earnings from
the Group Account rise by 0.4×1=0.4 francs. And the earnings of the other group members also rise by 0.4 francs
each, so that the total earnings of the group from the Group Account rise by 1.6 francs.
In summary, your period earnings are determined as follows:
Your earnings = earnings from the Individual Account + earnings from the Group Account =
=80 - (your allocation to the Group Account) + 0.4×(allocation of 4 group members to the Group Account)
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Example: Suppose that you allocated 40 francs to the Group Account and that the other three members of your
group allocated a total of 120 francs. This makes a total of 160 francs in the Group Account. In this case each
member of the group receives earnings from the Group Account of 0.4×160 = 64 francs. In addition, you also
receive 40 francs from your Individual Account since you have kept 40 francs to your Individual Account.
OUTCOME SCREEN
BLUE GAME: At the end of each period, your bid, the sum of all bids in your group, whether you received the
reward or not, and the earnings for the period are reported on the outcome screen as shown below. Once the
outcome screen is displayed you should record your results for the period on your Personal Record Sheet under the
appropriate heading.
GREEN GAME: At the end of each period, your allocation and the sum of all allocations in your group are
reported on the outcome screen as shown below. To aid you in your calculation, you are also shown your income
from your individual account and your income from the group account. Once the outcome screen is displayed you
should record your results for the period on your Personal Record Sheet under the appropriate heading.
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